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The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non-neutrality in
policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in
order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more
complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the non-
neutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an
inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some
other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union
interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a
policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the non-
neutrality result can arise.
JEL: E00, E52, J51.
Keywords: neutrality, money, unions, policy game.1
NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONETARY POLICY IN POLICY GAMES
Nicola Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
June, 2002
1. Introduction
The role of wages is crucial in the macroeconomic adjustment process. It is
important to understand how wages react to prices and vice versa, in
particular how the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on output and
prices depend on the response of wages to prices.
The interaction between monetary policy and wage setting has been
analysed in the 1970’s and 1980’s in terms of policy games especially in
order to examine questions of time consistency, central bank independence
and the like. A related aspect of such an interaction, that of non-neutrality of
money (i.e., the possibility for the monetary authorities to control the rate of
output), has firstly been tackled by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994). They
make use of a rather simple game between government and organised labour
and show that ‘monetary expansion stimulates output and employment
despite the optimal reaction of the unions as long as they care about
inflation’ (Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1994: 43).
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Recently, the property stressed by Gylfason and Lindbeck has been
largely used in the literature to derive several unconventional results. For
instance, Jensen (1997) shows how the Rogoff’s result of counter-
productiveness of international co-ordination is not robust when trade
unions are introduced as players. But Jensen’s result no longer holds if the
assumption of an inflation-averse union is removed. Cukierman and Lippi
(1999) derive a Calmfors and Driffill’s hump-shaped relationship between
the degree of centralisation and employment. However, also their result
collapses into a monotonic relationship if the assumption of an inflation-
averse union is removed. Moreover, their result is not robust also if an
information setting where players simultaneously interact (Nash
equilibrium) is considered, instead of a game where the unions are able to
pre-commit their wage policies (Stackelberg equilibrium). The reason why
the inflation-aversion assumption does not work in the Nash case is not
completely clear (see Ciccarone and Marchetti, 2001). Some other recent
studies—where the unions’ inflation-aversion plays a crucial role—are,
Grüner and Hefeker (1999), Guzzo and Velasco (1999), Lawler (2000a),
(2000b), (2001), and Cukierman and Lippi (2001).
1
The fruitfulness of the results obtained in policy games between the
central bank and one or several unions together with the criticisms on the
assumption of an inflation-averse union
2 has stimulated several studies
where non-neutrality comes out not from the union inflation-aversion but
from the interaction between the goods and labour market (Soskice and
Iversen, 1998 and 2000; Coricelli et al. 2000 and 2001; and Lippi, 2001).
However, also in these cases, the non-neutrality result is not robust with
respect to the elimination of one of the following assumptions: a multiplicity
of unions acting in the labour markets and monopolistic competitors in the
goods markets.
The literature on policy games and unionised economies has certainly
gone several steps further from the pioneering models of the 70’s. However,
not all the results are completely understood. In particular, although many
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studies have based their results on the non-neutrality proposition, only few
of them have challenged the task of studying its roots.
3
The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non-
neutrality in policy games involving trade unions in a simple set up in order
to clearly expose the basic mechanisms, which also works in more complex
frameworks. We will then show that there are common roots in the non-
neutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts. We will
finally show that there are other cases where these results can arise.
The following section will be devoted to clarifying the definition of
neutrality and the propositions so far advanced to state the conditions for
non-neutrality. Section 3, after presenting the model of a closed economy
and the players’ preferences, gives a first intuitive explanation of the non-
neutrality result. In section 4, the reasons determining non-neutrality are
further explained and generalised by taking account of the effects of a real
wage-wedge between consumers (workers) and producers (firms) by
considering, as an example, a more complex framework describing a small
fixed-exchange rate open economy. Section 5 states necessary and sufficient
conditions for non-neutrality to arise. Section 6 summarises our findings and
draws some general conclusions.
1.  The Non-Neutrality Proposition
The classical definition of money neutrality implies that autonomous
changes in money supply have no influence on the level of output. In the
realm of policy games such a definition cannot be maintained, as money
supply is an endogenous variable. The following definition of neutrality can
be accepted instead: When the optimal equilibrium output does not depend
on the preferences of the policy-maker, monetary policy is neutral.
Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) analyse the robustness of the property
of monetary policy neutrality in a simple game between a policymaker and a
union. By considering that the policymaker reasonably cares at least about
inflation and output and unions about the real wage and output (as a proxy
of employment), they derive a condition that allows monetary policy to be
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Cubitt (1997) are two exceptions (see next section).4
non-neutral. We can summarise their proposition (henceforth, the Non-
Neutrality Proposition, NNP) as follows: When the union’s preference takes
prices into account (GL’s assumption, henceforth), monetary policy is non-
neutral.
In particular, Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) show that non co-
operative maximisation of a union’s preference function quadratic in real
wages and income and a government’s utility function quadratic in both
income and prices implies a lower stagflation bias when a quadratic cost for
price stability is introduced in the union’s preference function. The effects
of an inflation-averse union are largely discussed in Cubitt (1995 and 1997).
In a critical extension of Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Acocella
and Ciccarone (1997) generalise Gylfason and Lindbeck’s (1994)
proposition as follows: When the union shares with the policymaker an
objective different from the real wage or employment (e.g., inflation or
fiscal deficit) monetary policy is non-neutral.
In this paper, we only consider the case when the union cares about
inflation. However, all results can be generalised in the way stressed by
Acocella and Ciccarone (1997: section 4) by introducing an objective
different from inflation.
2. The basic model and the players’ preferences
The economy is represented by the following general AD/AS model, which
can be derived and generalised in several alternative ways.
4
(1)  y = m – p
(2)  y = – η (w – p)
The meaning of variables is the following: m is the nominal supply of
money, p the price level, w the nominal wage, and η the real wage elasticity
                             
4 Our framework can be considered as a generalisation of the economy model used
in Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) and Acocella and Ciccarone (1997): non-unitary real
money balance and real wage elasticities of income are now assumed. A similar model is
used and derived in a different way, among the others, by Cubitt (1995).5
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following short-run production function (in levels): YN
θ =   by standard
computation under the assumption of profit maximising firms. The model
(1)–(2) is normalised in the real money balance elasticity of income,
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−
=−  (see Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2001a: appendix A for
normalisation details).
Equation (1), by making aggregate demand for output dependent upon
real money balances, shows the traditional inverse relationship, for a given
money supply, between demand for output and price level. Equation (2)
describes the aggregate supply of output by competitive profit-maximising
firms as negatively related to the real wage.
The above structural form model can be expressed in the reduced form
as follows:



















where u is the unemployment rate and n  the given labour force. Through
equation (5), we may talk of output (gap) and unemployment
interchangeably.
In this economy, there are two active players:
5 a policymaker and a
monopolist trade union. The former sets the nominal money supply; the
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5 Firms also operate. They maximise profits, but are not active players.6
where π = p – p–1  is the inflation rate; the two pairs {πP = pP – p–1, πU = pU
– p–1} and {yP, yU} give the players’ target values of inflation and income
respectively. By assuming some “prior” level of prices, we may talk of
inflation and current prices interchangeably (Cubitt, 1995: 247). We will
assume p–1 = 0 for expositional convenience and without loss of generality.
Policymaker’s utility is quadratic in inflation and output, while the union’s
utility is quadratic in the same arguments and linear in the real wage. All
marginal rates of substitution are assumed to be finite and positive, unless
differently stated. For a more accurate description of such functions we refer
to Acocella and Ciccarone (1997) and the references therein contained.
6
The non co-operative Nash solution is obtained by maximising the
functions of the players with respect to their respective controls and solving.
The resulting reaction functions are:
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where, in order to simplify the exposition, pP = pU = 0 is assumed without
loss of generality.
The optimal values of control variables are given by the following
equations.
                             
6 The preferences used by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) are not exactly the same as
those used in this paper. However, our representation of preferences is equivalent to that
used by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) in the following sense. All results of the closed
economy model hold also with the Gylfason and Lindbeck’s (1994) preferences. On the
contrary, when an open economy is considered, different preference specifications will be
explicitly taken into account (see section 4). In general, we have reported only the most
interesting results for reason of conciseness. However, all solutions (i.e. those referred to
both the closed and open economy model) with all the different union’s preference
functions described in this paper are available on request.7
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Then Gylfason and Lindbeck’s NNP is robust with respect to any pair
of real money balance and real wage output elasticities (i.e. to any η).
However, looking at the stability condition:
(14)   () ()
2 1 η β ηϑ ϑη β −− < + +
the following further observation can be introduced. When a non-unitary
elasticity is considered the Nash solution can be unstable, whereas when η =
1 the Nash solution is always stable. In more details when β > η >ϑ ,
equation (14) could not be satisfied.
This result seems to be of some relevance. In fact, for some value of η
the standard proposition very common in the literature on the conservative
central banker (Rogoff-Svensson’s proposition) – increasing the central
bank independence (i.e. raising β) reduces the inflation bias
7 – could not
hold. In other terms, even if we raise β  – i.e. central bank independence –
the inflation bias would not be reduced. For some value of η and ϑ  (with
η ϑ > ), even high values of β (with β η > ) could be associated to an
                             
7 See Rogoff (1985) and Svensson (1997). Critiques to Rogoff-Svensson’s
proposition have been recently raised by, among the others, Lawler (2000a and 2001).8
unstable Nash solution. Our result is independent of the assumption that the
union cares about inflation. It could be verified also when  0 ϑ = . Therefore,
removing the assumption of a long-term wage-contract from the standard
Barro-Gordon’s (1983) model and thus allowing for a simultaneous setting
of the nominal wage and the nominal money supply, Rogoff-Svensson’s
proposition does not always hold.
Apart from the question of stability, as said before, we have checked
the robustness of the NNP with respect to different players’ preferences,
e.g., quadratic in all the arguments or linear in the output and quadratic in
other arguments. We can thus say that, in our closed economy model,
preference functions of the kinds above mentioned imply neutrality, whereas
the non-neutrality holds when inflation is added as a further argument.
An intuitive explanation for this result is the following. When output
and the real wage are the only arguments of the union’s preference function
it is always possible to rewrite the union’s preference function in terms of
the real wage or output only. In fact, given the aggregate supply function of
our model, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two
arguments. Therefore, the union has to set one instrument, i.e. the nominal
wage rate, against one target, which can be expressed either in terms of real
wage or employment. On the contrary, given our setting, the policymaker’s
preference function cannot be reduced to one objective. Therefore, the
policymaker has to set one instrument to maximise a preference function
having two targets. Then it faces a real trade-off.
The economic meaning of this is clear if the adjustment process
around the Nash equilibrium is considered. After having set the nominal
wage at an optimal level, the union’s policy is simply to react to any
increase in money with an increase in the nominal wage, thus pushing up
inflation and maintaining its optimal level of output (real wage) until the
cost in terms of inflation for the policymaker is too high to expect further
reactions from the latter.
8
Introducing an inflation term into the union’s preference function
breaks the above one-to-one correspondence between real wage and output
                             
8 In terms of game theory this means that the output (real wage) is constant along the
union’s reaction function.9
and therefore this function can no longer be expressed in terms of one such
variable only.
9
Introduction of an inflation term into the union’s preference function
can take place directly or indirectly.
The former case is obvious. There may be reasons why unions care
about inflation. The large number of retired workers who are members of
the unions in certain countries with not indexed pensions may be one such
reason. The unions may be also opposed to inflation because this not only
reduces the real wage of a representative member, but also has a negative
impact on the member’s savings accounts and other nominal assets (see
Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1994; and al-Nowaihi and Levine, 1994)   Another
reason can be of a socio-political nature: The union may be involved in a
policy of cutting down a high level inflation that can have the effect to break
up the socio-political system. Apart from these cases one could generally
agree with Iversen and Soskice (2000) that introducing an inflation term
directly into the union’s preference function is an ad hoc assumption to get
non-neutrality.
The above mechanism leads to non-neutrality of monetary policy
when the game is played according to a different order of moves (using the
concept of Nash sub-game perfect equilibria) (a proof is available from the
authors  upon request).
The union may be induced to care about inflation also indirectly, in a
number of ways. One such way is considering a co-operative game between
a union and a policymaker who cares about inflation. Non-neutrality can
derive from co-operation between an inflation-neutral union and an
inflation-averse policymaker. Another way for introducing inflation
indirectly into the union’s preference function may be when a wedge arises
between the wage relevant for the union and the wage relevant for firms’
labour demand. In this case, even if the union cares only about real wages
and output, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the real wage
relevant for the union and that directly relevant for the output; the union’s
preference function can be shown to depend on output and the price level. If
this is the case, non-neutrality may arise. However, this result emphasises
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the importance of the kind of game played and the exact specification of the
union’s preference function.
There are several ways to introduce a real wage-wedge and, therefore,
inflation in the union’s preference. The real wage relevant for workers can
differ from that relevant for firms because of taxation. However, to
represent a situation of this kind would require a much more complicated
model. In a context where several unions interact in monopolistic goods
markets, the real wage relevant for a union would not correspond to that
relevant for the firm that bargains for the nominal wage with the union,
since the former will be calculated by considering the average price index
whereas the latter is computed by taking account of the firm’s product price
only. Similarly, in an open economy, the relevant wage for the union is the
wage calculated on the basis of the consumer price index (which includes
also the foreign good price). On the contrary, the firm faces a real wage that
is equal to the nominal wage deflated by the domestic product price index.
In the next section we will show how consideration of the wage-wedge has a
crucial impact on the result of our kind of models by considering the latter
example. However, our results can be generalised to different mechanisms
introducing a real wage-wedge.
10
4. The real wage-wedge effect: An example
4.1 The NNP in a small open economy
In this section we consider a more complex model of the economic
structure. Our aim is to test the robustness of neutrality of monetary policy
with respect to relevant changes in the original model. We still consider a
simple set-up but we take account of two further aspects that characterise a
small fixed-exchange open economy.
11
First, in order to consider international competitiveness, the term
µ(p – ep
*) is introduced in equation (1), where: e and p
* are the given
                             
10 See Di Bartolomeo (2002: appendix 3) for additional examples.
11 Unions’ action and interaction in an open economy have been recently analyzed
also by Iversen and Soskice (1998); Grüner and Hefeker (1999); Cukierman and Lippi
(2001); and Lawler (2000b).11
nominal exchange rate and the foreign price level respectively;
12 µ is the
real exchange rate elasticity of output (as previously µ is normalised in the
real money balance elasticity of income).
Secondly, in an open economy the relevant real wage for firms could
be different from that relevant for the union (see Acocella and Di
Bartolomeo, 2001a). The relevant real wage for firms, ω 
F, is expressed in
terms of product prices while the one relevant for the union, ω 
U, is referred
to the consumer price index:
(15)  ω 
F = w – p
(16)  ω 
U = w – hp – (1 – h) p
*
where h is the weight of domestic goods in the consumption basket of wage-
earners.
The model can be re-written as:
13
(17)  y = m – p – µ (p – ep
*)
(18)  y = – ηω 
F
and the preference functions become:
(19)   () ()
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22
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The Nash equilibrium level of output and the Nash equilibrium price
level turn out to be:
                             
12 Since our aim is to study the basic roots of non-neutrality simple assumptions are
proposed. The reader interested in this subject can see Lawler (2000b). We also assume
sterilisation of the monetary consequences of the current account imbalances and, more
generally, a short-run setting.
13 For a more rigorous derivation of the model see Gylfason and Lindbeck (1990).12
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Therefore, Gylfason and Lindbeck’s NNP holds (i.e. monetary policy
is non-neutral when the union cares about inflation). This result is not
surprising.
If we assume ϑ  = 0, equations (21) and (22) become:


























and neutrality holds. Moreover, it is easy to check that, when h = 1,
equilibrium values do not depend on the assumption of an open economy
and are the same as those found for the closed economy model when ϑ  = 0.
This occurs for the same reason already explained at the end of section 3
(i.e., the existence of a one-to-one relationship between output and the real
wage).
On the contrary, when h is less than one, the equilibrium values of
output, real wage rates and inflation are different from the corresponding
values in a closed economy. This is partly attributable to the existence in an
open economy of parameters, like h and µ, which in any case influence
these variables and partly attributable to the different way the economy
works. The output level is lower in our open economy essentially for the
existence of a free rider problem in wage setting, since h < 1. Moreover,
there is a negative influence on the terms of trade worsening induced by the
wage rise.
In the open economy case with h < 1, two wage rates exist. Since one
of them (the real wage in terms of consumer prices) is relevant for the
union, whereas the other (i.e., the real wage in terms of product prices) is
one-to-one related to the output, it is impossible to express the union’s
preference function in terms of only one of its arguments. But, since the13
union faces a marginal rate of substitution between the arguments of its
preference function that depends only on the deviation of output from the
bliss point (and not on prices), it has an incentive to pursue the output target.
In other terms, the cost of its policy in terms of wage (or output) does not
vary according to the level of prices. Then the union tends to pursue the
maximisation of its preference function irrespectively of the price level
associated with its strategy. This leaves no room for the policymaker to
trade-off its output target against the inflation target
However, the reader should note that, differently from the closed
economy case, now a crucial role is played by the specification of the
preference function. We will explore the difference with other specifications
in subsection 4.3.
Before that, in the next subsection we consider the influence of
different information settings.
4.2 Other information settings
As in previous sections, after tedious algebra, we obtain the optimal solution
when the policymaker is the Stackelberg leader:
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Again, without the assumption ϑ ≠ 0, non-neutrality vanishes and,
when h = 1 (i.e., there is no wage-wedge) is also assumed the result is
independent of international competitiveness.
In a similar way, the optimal solution when the union is the
Stackelberg leader follows:
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Ifϑ  = 0, monetary policy is not neutral (unless h = 1), even if GL’s
assumption does not hold and the results are always independent of
international competitiveness. This occurs because, when the union acts as a
leader, it maximises its preference function respecting the policymaker’s
reaction function, thus implicitly taking prices into account.
14
More in detail, explanations of the different outcomes of Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria resides in a particular property of the marginal rate of
substitution between the arguments of the union’s preference function
implied by equation (20): the rate is independent of the real wage. The
effects of this property can be easily understood by rewriting equation (20)
in terms of real output and price for a generic level of union’s satisfaction
( U U ):
15









−+− + − − − −= 

Equation (29) is the analytical representation of the union’s
indifference curves drawn in Figure 1. The reaction function of the union is
built in panel (a), whereas panel (b) describes the games between the union
and the central bank.
                             
14 This does not happen in the closed economy case, where the union’s indifference
curves on the (m, w) plane are linear, since there is no wage-wedge, and therefore the
Stackelberg solution is a ‘limit’ solution coinciding with the Nash equilibrium. See
Hersoug (1985) for a discussion of a similar Stackelberg equilibrium in a government-
union game.
15 Equation (29) is obtained by adding and subtracting p to equation (20) and by
considering equation (18), which in equilibrium always holds. By doing so, we have taken
account of the relation between real wages and output given by the demand for labour.15
(a) (b)
Figure 1
In figure 1 (panel a), the union’s indifference curves are no longer
straight lines – as they would be in the case when h = 1 – but parabolas.
However, they still imply a vertical union’s reaction function (UU).
16
Neutrality is, therefore, the straightforward result of both Nash equilibrium
and of the Stackelberg equilibrium where the policymaker acts as the leader
of the game (panel b, point N and L). On the contrary, when union
leadership is introduced, monetary policy is non-neutral and, according to
realistic assumptions about the relative value of some parameters, real
output (inflation) will be higher (lower) than its value associated with the
Nash equilibrium. In this case, the union uses its first-mover advantage to
pre-commit itself to a (credible) wage moderation strategy in order to reduce
the price conflict with the policymaker and, therefore, to internalise the
                             
16 The reaction function of the union is drawn by considering the highest
indifference curve for each given aggregate demand (e.g. AD1,  AD2  and  AD3). The
policymaker’s reaction function (PP) is drawn in a similar manner considering the given
aggregate supplies (which, however, have not been drawn in the figure). Since we are
interested in the effects of wage and monetary policies on macroeconomic outcomes, we
have represented the reaction functions and the equilibrium in the space of objectives
instead of that of the controls. In our game, the task is easy since the union controls the AS
and the policymaker the AD (see Cubitt, 1997).16
negative externality associated with price increase effects on
competitiveness.
17
The equilibrium associated with the policymaker’s leadership is
represented by point L. The policymaker’s leadership corresponds to a game
played according to a credible fixed monetary policy rule. Therefore, not
surprisingly, the policymaker is able to get rid of the inflation bias leaving,
however, unchanged the real output level, which he cannot affect (neutrality
again arises).
The game-leader is always better off. However, when the union is
the leader both players are able to reach a higher indifference curve than that
associated to the Nash equilibrium. The union’s gain is clear from the
figure, whereas since both output and inflation are closer to his target, also
the policymaker gets a higher utility than that associated with the Nash
equilibrium. On the contrary, when the central bank is the leader of the
game, the union will obtain the worst utility result.
The next section will confirm the relevance of the union’s preference
specification and of the consequent form of the marginal rate of substitution
between its arguments.
4.3 Different union’s preferences
Equation (20) is common in the policy game literature (see, among others,
Acocella and Ciccarone, 1997; Grüner and Hefeker, 1999; Cukierman and
Lippi, 1999). As previously said, when a closed economy model like that
presented in section 3 is considered, the propositions obtained by using
equation (20) are robust with respect to a large number of different
specifications of union preferences. However, this is not the case when an
open economy is considered.
In this section, we analyse the competitiveness and wage-wedge
effects under different union preferences. First, we consider a union
preference function quadratic in both arguments, used by Gylfason and
Lindbeck (1994). Second, we present an alternative semi-quadratic function
(linear in the output and quadratic in the real wage), introduced by Acocella
and Di Bartolomeo (2001a). For reasons of conciseness we will consider
                             
17 Notice that both the wage-wedge and the competitiveness effects are needed to
assure non-neutrality of monetary policy.17
only Nash non co-operative solutions. Furthermore, we will restrict to the
case when ϑ  = 0, since the relevant question is whether in an open
economy the NNP holds under different specifications of the union
preference functions without GL’s assumption. The reason for doing so is
Gylfason and Lindbeck’s (1994) claim that the assumption ϑ ≠ 0 can be
considered a shortcut to account for the effect of competitiveness on union
wage-policies in an open economy.
18
The union preference function used in Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994)
is:
(30)   () ()





ωω =− − − −
Substituting equation (30) for equation (20) and solving, as previously
done, we obtain the Nash non co-operative solution, which is:
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18 However, we have checked that, not surprisingly, the NNP holds under all union’s
preference specifications when inflation is inserted as a quadratic term into the union
preference function. On the contrary, when an argument linear in inflation is considered,
results are the same as in the case of a union indifferent to prices.18
Equation (33) confirms the result of equation (23). When there is no
wage-wedge, non-neutrality holds and there is no effect of competitiveness
on output. On the contrary, equation (31) shows, in contrast with (23), that
non-neutrality holds (for h < 1) even if ϑ  = 0 and then the NNP does not
hold.
Thus in an open economy we do not get the results expected by
Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) (i.e., wage moderation and money non-
neutrality). In fact, only if h < 1 is assumed non-neutrality holds. However,
considering an inflation-averse union cannot be the shortcut suggested by
Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994). When an open economy is modelled, quite
the opposite effect is observed as a consequence of union’s free riding: the
higher nominal wage (because of the wage-wedge) implies a lower output
level, the more so the higher the degree of international competition (i.e., the
higher µ).
When we consider equation (30) instead of equation (20), we obtain
non-neutrality. This occurs simply because the marginal rate of substitution
between the real wage and output is not independent of the actual level of
the real wage (and, thus, of prices). Therefore, the union is ‘forced to share’
the payoff in terms of output with the policymaker. This result holds true
also for a preference function linear in output and quadratic in the real wage.
In fact, also this preference function is characterised by a marginal rate of
substitution between the union’s objectives independent of the actual level
of output, but not of the actual level of real wage.
The union’s preference quadratic in the real wage and linear in the real
output is:






ωω =− − +
This function emphasises the prominence of the real wage in
modelling the union’s behaviour.
19
                             
19 Notice that all the three kinds of preference function considered are assumed to
exist (in terms of domain) since the union’s satisfaction can be assumed to be increasing in
the real wage and employment. Therefore, all the specifications are associated with
indifference curves having a positive slope in the space of real wage and real output.
Differences among different preference functions are thus only related to the curvatures of19
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and, therefore, non-neutrality holds again without GL’s assumption.
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and neutrality holds. Furthermore, the outcomes are the same as those of the
closed economy case (i.e. h = 1 and µ = 0), since equations (38) and (39) are
independent of h and µ.
Summarising our findings, unlikely in the closed economy case, in an
open economy different preference functions can lead to different results.
The specification of the union’s preferences requires more attention and
should be justified theoretical reasoning as well as empirical evidence. In
addition, robustness of the results (i.e. equivalence under different union’s
preference specifications) should be checked.
20
                                                                   
their indifference curves. In particular, different preferences imply marginal rate of
substitutions between their arguments that differently depend on the current values of real
output and the real wage.
20 In our case, e.g., when a closed economy of the kind described in section 3 and 4
is considered, all the three above described specifications imply the same results, which,
therefore, can be claimed as general at least in our linear-quadratic context. The same is
true in an open economy without a wage-wedge. However, when the wage-wedge is
introduced, this equivalence does no longer hold.20
The way we interpreted our results can be fruitful also in settings
different from those considered in this paper. In more comprehensive terms,
in any model where there is a real wage-wedge, we could obtain the same
general result of non-neutrality. For instance, this would be the case of a
wage-wedge induced by taxation, instead of the openness of the economy.
Some recent models, mentioned in the introduction, implicitly
introduce a real wage-wedge to achieve non-neutrality by considering the
simultaneous existence of monopolistic competitors in the goods markets
and several trade unions. In this case, each union’s real wage depends on the
union nominal wage and on consumer prices whereas the real wage relevant
for each firm depends on the union nominal wage and on its product price.
Our results explain why in these models non-neutrality is not robust with
respect to the elimination of the assumption of either a multiplicity of
unions or monopolistic competition in goods markets: The dropping of one
of the two would eliminate the real wage-wedge from the labour market side
or from the goods markets one (e.g., this is the case of Iversen and Soskice,
1998; Cukierman and Lippi, 1999 and 2000; Coricelli et al, 2000 and 2001).
5. Non-neutrality and costs and benefits of the union’s wage policies
Section 3 gave an intuitive explanation of neutrality based on the
impossibility to reduce the union’s preference function to one objective (real
wages or output) – apart from inflation - after substituting the demand for
labour into the union’s preference and so eliminating the a priori
dependency between output and the real wage. The presence of a union that
is inflation-averse (GL’s assumption) may imply non-neutrality by
removing the above impossibility. However, as shown in section 4, the latter
is neither a necessary
21 nor a sufficient condition,
22 as the union’s care for
inflation can derive indirectly, via the introduction of a wage-wedge or co-
operatively playing. On the other hand, even if the union directly takes
                             
21 This argument is different from that of Acocella and Ciccarone (1997), as we are
not here considering the possibility that non-neutrality can derive from the union sharing an
objective different from inflation with the government. We will tackle this issue below.
22 As shown for the indirect case, it easy to verify that if inflation directly enters as a
linear term in the union preference, non-neutrality vanishes as well as NNP.21
account of prices in its preference function, the information setting and the
form (not only the arguments) of the union’s preference function are
relevant for non-neutrality to hold.
In our simple set up, a necessary condition to get non-neutrality is
that the union ultimately includes the effects of prices into its preference
function. This means that the union’s preference function depends not only
on output, but also on prices after taking account of the demand for labour
23
. Let us call this condition ‘inflation-augmented preference function’.
This necessary condition needs one of the two following
qualifications to become also sufficient for non-neutrality to hold:
1.  the marginal rate of substitution between output and prices in the
‘inflation-augmented preference function’ should depend on prices; or
2.  the union should be able to pre-commit its wage policy.
Let us go into details with the necessary condition first and the
necessary and sufficient conditions after.
The necessity of an inflation-augmented preference function for
having non-neutrality is rather easy to explain. It is simply a generalisation
of GL’s assumption deriving from the consideration that not only the direct
inclusion of inflation into the union’s preference function, but also the
specification of the structural model or the kind of game played can
indirectly make the union care for inflation. In our model of section 3 the
relevant economic outcomes are inflation and real output and there is no a
priori  trade-off – i.e., no trade-off built in the model – between these
variables: All possible pairs of inflation and output can in principle be
achieved. A trade-off could only arise if the players want to pursue different
targets at the same time. If the union is inflation neutral, to pursue its sole
objective it can raise nominal wages considering that money expansion and
price rises can take place only up to the point where further monetary
expansion will no longer be profitable for the policymaker. In other words,
the process will continue until the marginal cost for the policymaker of
increasing the money supply (due to the higher prices) is equal to its
marginal benefit (due to the output increases). Neutrality is the clear result
of the game: the policymaker cannot influence the real wage and output, but
only inflation.
                             
23 See, e.g., the procedure we followed to obtain equation (35).22
On the contrary, if the union takes inflation into account (in addition
to caring about the real wage), both players face a real trade-off. For
example, in the case of an inflation-averse union, in setting the nominal
wage also the union equalises the marginal cost of, e.g., increasing the wage
(in terms of higher prices) to its marginal benefit (in terms of decreasing
output, which implies higher real wages). Therefore, non-neutrality may
emerge. However, as it has been argued, an additional qualification is
needed to ensure it. Either the union’s marginal rate of substitution between
the output and prices depends on the latter variable or the union must be
able to pre-commit its wage policy.
If the union’s marginal rate of substitution depends on prices, both
players’ trade-offs – between inflation and output – depend on the price
level. Let us consider, e.g., the case in which higher prices, with a given
output level, reduce the union’s utility. If the union’s marginal rate of
substitution between the output and prices depends on prices, any attempt of
the union to reach a lower real output (a higher real wage) by raising
nominal wages will be to some extent restrained by its negative impact on
prices, the more so the higher the initial price level. This leaves room for the
government’s setting of money to have an effect on the output, since the
government’s choice can influence the price level and, thus, the disposition
of the union to further increase nominal wages. On the contrary, if the
marginal rate does not depend on prices, the costs of the wage policy do not
depend on the level of prices, and therefore, the policymaker is unable to
affect the union’s strategies (which consist in setting the marginal benefit of
increasing the wage equal to its marginal cost).
In the case of a union that, directly or indirectly, does not care about
prices the marginal rate of substitution for the union does not depend on
prices, simply because no such marginal rate can be defined. In other cases
it can be defined, since the union’s preference, directly or indirectly,
depends on prices, but does not vary according to prices. If such cases,
neutrality follows. If, on the contrary, the marginal rate of substitution
depends on prices, non-neutrality holds.
If the union is able to pre-commit its wage policy, in order to obtain
non-neutrality, the dependence of the union’s marginal rate of substitution
on prices is not required. When the union has the information advantage of
the first mover, it will consider this additional information in equalising the
marginal cost of its wage policy to its marginal benefit. Since the reaction of23
the policymaker depends on the level of prices, the union will take account
of it in trading-off its utility in terms of prices with that in terms of output.
Summarising, given the direct or indirect influence of prices on the
union’s preference, both qualifications needed to assure non-neutrality can
be explained in a similar manner. In fact, what is important in both the
above cases is the possibility for monetary policy to affect the union’s
choice by influencing the marginal cost or benefit of its wage policy. In
setting its optimal policy the union will always compare its marginal cost
with its marginal benefit.
In the end, together with the other elements hitherto considered (the
arguments of the union’s preference function, the model of the economy),
what is relevant for non-neutrality is the dependence on the money supply
of the  marginal costs and benefits that the union faces when it sets its
optimal wage policy. Such dependence can be derived directly from the
price effects (and, therefore, money supply) on the marginal rate of
substitution or indirectly from the information advantage associated with a
game where the union is able to pre-commit its policy.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have generalised the results obtained in a number of papers
about non-neutrality of money in policy games between a policymaker and
one or more unions. The main aim of this article has been to investigate the
sources of non-neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade
unions in a simple set up, so as to highlight the basic mechanisms at work.
According to some usual and general basic assumptions in linear quadratic
games, we have found necessary and sufficient conditions for non-neutrality
to hold.
In a Tinbergen’s fashion, neutrality is finally determined by a
particular specification of the policy game in terms of relations between
instruments and targets. In our initial specification – where the union does
not care about inflation – both the union and the policymaker have two
apparently independent arguments in their preference functions and one
instrument. However, the union’s arguments may not be truly independent,
and, therefore, neutrality necessarily arises when the two union’s objectives
can be reduced to one, by taking the model of the economy into account. On24
the contrary, when the objectives of each player are really independent,
which happens when the union – in addition to caring for the real wage and
output – also dislikes inflation, the players are forced to share their payoffs.
Then neutrality can arise only as a particular case. Moreover, the possible
existence of a real wage-wedge plays an important role, since it is a way to
indirectly introduce inflation in the union preference and so to break down
the one-to-one correspondence between the real wage relevant for the union
and output.
More in detail, we have shown that a necessary albeit not sufficient
condition for non-neutrality to arise is that the union takes account of prices
in its preference function, either directly or indirectly. Two further
qualifications are in order to have sufficient conditions: either the marginal
rate of substitution between output and prices in the union’s ‘inflation-
augmented preference function’ depends on prices or the union should be
able to pre-commit is wage policy.
This perspective makes it easy to understand the common roots in
the non-neutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as:
an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing a
common objective with a policy maker; several unions interacting with a
policymaker and with monopolistic competitors in the goods market.25
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